Models of corporate behavior normally assume that a firm acts in the interest of shareholders, and that shareholders care only about the returns they receive on the shares they own in that firm. But shareholders should also care about the effects of a manager's decisions on the value of shares they own in other firms, on the price they pay as consumers for the firm's output, on the costs they bear from pollutants emitted by the firm, on the value of the firm's bonds they own, on government tax revenue that finances public expenditures benefiting shareholders, etc. These effects are normally presumed to be of second order. This paper reexamines this presumption, argues that many of these effects are likely to be important, and explores the resulting implications for forecasted corporate behavior.
Introduction
Models of the behavior of corporations normally assume that managers are under strong financial pressure to act in the interests of the firm's shareholders, and furthermore that shareholders care about the manager's decisions only insofar as these decisions affect the returns shareholders receive on the shares they own in that firm. If the return distribution on new projects is within the span of the distributions on available securities, then shareholders unanimously want the manager to maximize share values.
1 This is the basic objective that papers normally attribute to corporations.
2
However, a manager's decisions can affect shareholders in more ways than just through their effects on the value of shares in that firm. To begin with, shareholders normally hold highly diversified portfolios, so they should want a manager to take into account as well any effects her decisions might have on the share values of other firms.
3 If shareholders hold proportional amounts of all the firms in an industry, for example, then their portfolio value is maximized if they can induce each manager to maximize the market value of their portfolio as a whole. A manager would do this by taking into account any externalities her firm imposes on other firms from price changes, from advertising, or from the spillover of information from R&D. Everything else equal, this would lead shareholders to prefer that firms behave as a cartel and charge the monopoly price, regardless of the implications for the share values of individual firms. However, shareholders are also consumers, and to that degree want to discourage firms from exploiting their market power.
4 Shareholders may at times be employees of the firm, and so might be concerned with wage rates as well as returns on equity.
5 To the degree that shareholders live near the firm, they are harmed by any pollutants emitted by the firm. 6 To the degree that shareholders are altruistic, they would benefit from corporate donations to charity.
7 Similarly, to the degree that shareholders also own bonds issued by the firm, there is less of a conflict between bond holders and equity holders, lowering the agency costs of debt.
8 Shareholders are also normally citizens of the country in which the firm is located, and therefore benefit from any tax payment that the firm might make. For example, multinational firms may shift profits back to their home country, even if this implies somewhat higher tax payments on net.
9
All of these forecasts are for publicly traded corporations, since they are widely held. Owners of closely held firms, in contrast, would not face such pressures, suggesting a change in a firm's behavior when it goes public.
Agency problems certainly weaken shareholders' ability to induce managers to take account of the types of supplementary concerns described above. Observed compensation schemes seem simply to push managers to maximize their own firm's share value. However, anomalies in these compensation schemes, and in firm behavior, may well be explained by the model in this paper.
The objective of this paper is to explore the possible influence of these other objectives of shareholders on firm behavior. Section 1 develops a simple model exploring the degree to which a firm, acting in the interests of shareholders, should take into account the benefits it generates for others.
10 Several other examples of other objectives of shareholders are then discussed, some drawing on recent work in the literature. Section 2 examines the effects of competition among shareholders for control of the firm's behavior. Section 3 examines how agency problems affect the arguments in the paper. Finally, the last section summarizes the implications of these results.
Equilibrium when managers act in the interests of shareholders

A. Basic model
This section develops a simple model to demonstrate the nature of the argument. The economy consists of F firms and I individuals, and lasts for two periods. Firm profits are risky, so that shareholders will hold diversified portfolios. The country is assumed to be small relative to the world capital market, so that the market interest rate, denoted by r, is taken as given.
In addition to receiving a return on the firm's shares, investors can be affected by some other action of firm f, denoted by Z f . The variable Z f can capture the effects of pollution emissions, charitable donations, or even the price customers are charged for the firm's output. It includes all effects on these individuals other than through the return on their shares.
Firm f has initial assets K 1 f , derived perhaps from past capital investments. These can be retained and invested in productive capital or paid out as dividends to shareholders in the first period. Let K f denote the amount retained as productive capital, so that D
11 For simplicity, assume that capital does not depreciate. Let K denote the vector, of length F , of the amount of productive capital in each firm, so that K = (K 1 , . . . , K F ). Similarly, let Z denote the vector of the Z f .
9 Foreign subsidiaries in the U.S., for example, report unusually low taxable income in the U.S., compared with observationally equivalent U.S. firms. See Grubert et al (1993) for detailed evidence. 10 For a related model, see Hansen and Lott (1996) .
In the second period, the firm receives profitsθ f π f (K, Z), whereθ f is stochastic. Here, I capture any externalities across firms by allowing the profits of each firm to depend on both the capital investment decisions and the decisions Z f made by all other firms. At the end of the second period, each firm shuts down, paying out its capital stock plus its aftertax profits as a dividend to shareholders. Dividend payments to the firm's shareholders in the second period equalD
In the first period, I assume that each individual i divides his initial assets, A i , between riskless bonds and shares in each of the firms. In particular, assume that individual i buys the fraction α if of each firm f . Any remaining assets, plus initial dividend payments, are invested in riskless bonds. Individual i's holdings of riskless bonds are denoted by B i , and the initial market value of the shares of firm f is denoted by V f . The individual's first-period budget constraint is therefore
During the second period, each individual consumes all his assets. Therefore, second period consumption of individual i, denotedC i , equalsC
In making decisions, the individual acts so as to maximize ex ante expected utility, denoted by EU (C i )W i (Z).
12 Here, the shape of the function U is assumed to be the same for all individuals, and to satisfy constant relative risk aversion. Therefore, U (C i ) =C γ i /γ, where γ − 1 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The function W i captures the effects of Z, and can differ by individual. Optimal portfolio choice implies that individual i should be indifferent to a small shift in assets from equity in firm f to bonds. Differentiating utility with respect to α if , and taking account of how bond holdings must adjust to satisfy the first-period budget constraint, yields the first-order condition
This equation implies that E(U iθ f )/EU i has the same value for all i. This ratio simply equals the certainty equivalent of the lotteryθ f . Denote this common value by R f . The separation theorem holds under our assumptions, so individuals divide their portfolios between riskless bonds and the market portfolio of risky securities. Therefore, the fraction of shares that individual i holds in firm f , α if , satisfies: α if = α i β f , where α i is the fraction of the market portfolio of equity held by individual i and β f is the fraction of this market portfolio represented by shares in firm f . How is any shareholder i affected by a marginal increase in K f by some firm f , financed out of foregone dividends in period 1? Differentiating expected utility, we find that shareholder i is indifferent, so views the current capital stock as optimal, when
First, we find that shareholders all agree on the choice of K f . Since shareholders hold diversified portfolios, they take into account all externalities that this choice has for the overall profits in the economy, and not just for the profits of firm f. Note that this conclusion does not depend on the initial wealth distribution. In contrast, if the firm were to choose K f to maximize its share value, taking as given the return distributions of other firms, the conventional assumption, then its choice would be characterized by R f ∂π f /∂K f = r. This would be the optimal choice in our setting only with no spillovers from K f across firms, in which case the two expressions are equal. We have many reasons to expect spillovers across firms, however. For one, output decisions affect market prices, with implications for competing firms. Advertising expenditures largely attract sales from competing firms. R&D expenditures may make the technologies of competing firms obsolete, but also these firms may be able to copy the new technology easily and benefit from the expenditures.
What about the firm's choice of Z f ? For purposes of discussion, assume that Z f provides benefits to shareholders, as with charitable donations. Motivated by this case, assume also that the decision on Z f occurs ex post, onceθ f is known. The conventional assumption here would be that the firm would choose any such Z f to maximize profits, implying that ∂π f /∂Z f = 0.
13 In our setting, the optimal choice for Z f from the perspective of individual i instead satisfies
The term in brackets on the left-hand side simply converts the utility gain from a marginal increase in Z f into the dollar-equivalent gain. The right-hand side measures individual i's share of the dollar cost from a marginal increase in Z f , expressed as a positive number. We see from equation (4) that all shareholders would want the firm to take into account fully any effects of Z f on the profits of other firms. Individuals differ however in the fraction of these costs, α i , that they bear, and in the degree to which they are affected directly by Z f . Those who bear a large fraction of the costs, through having a high α i , and who receive little of the benefits, through having a small value of ∂W i /∂Z f , want a small value of Z f , and conversely.
In choosing Z f , the natural assumption is that the firm follows the preferences of the median shareholder, weighting each individual by the number of shares she owns.
14 In particular, assign to each share the dollar equivalent gain from Z f , divided by the value of α i , for the owner of this share. The firm would base its decision on the median value of this figure, across all shares.
In contrast, the choice of Z f would be socially efficient if the sum of the costs of a 13 For example, it would make charitable donations only to the extent that they raise profits, e.g. through increased goodwill with customers.
14 I assume, however, that portfolio decisions made by any individual investor are too small to affect the characteristics of the median shareholder, so that no additional complications enter into portfolio decisions.
marginal change in Z f just equals the sum of the dollar-equivalent social marginal benefits:
Equations (4) and (5) lead to the same allocation, so that the market equilibrium is efficient, if and only if the fraction of the firm's shares owned by the median shareholder equals the fraction of the overall gains received by this median shareholder. This situation is directly analogous to a Lindahl equilibrium, in which marginal costs are allocated in proportion to marginal benefits. The conventional assumption that the firm chooses Z f simply to maximize share values is equivalent in our setting to the assumption that the median shareholder holds a large enough fraction of the firm's shares that any effects of Z f are of second order. For example, suppose that only a few shareholders living near the firm are affected by donations to the local United Way. Then the firm, following the preferences of the median shareholder, will ignore these benefits.
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In contrast, the Lindahl equilibrium of equation (5) will hold if the dollar benefit to a shareholder from a marginal increase in Z f is proportional to her wealth, since our assumptions imply that α i will be proportional to wealth. Consider, for example, the special case in which the utility function is Cobb-Douglas:
Then the dollar equivalent gain from a marginal increase in Z f equals δC i /γZ f . Since Z f is necessarily the same for all shareholders, the dollar-equivalent value of a marginal increase in Z f is then proportional to C i . If all consumption is financed out of wealth, as in the above model, then C i is proportional to α i . All shareholders will then agree on the choice of Z f , as in the Lindahl equilibrium, e.g. they may agree on the size of the firm's donation to a nationally based charity.
Note, however, that the model does not take into account human capital. Consumption can be financed by current and future labor income as well as by financial assets, whereas shareholdings just depend on financial wealth. For this reason, the above example is indeed a special case.
16
In the next section, I will discuss the implications of the above results for a variety of possible externalities that a firm might generate.
Not all firms are corporations, and not all corporations have shares that are publicly traded. The above results apply only to publicly traded corporations. In contrast, closely held firms normally have very few owners, with each owner investing a substantial fraction of his or her portfolio in the firm. These owners of a closely held firm care primarily about the value of their firm. As a result, implications of the firm's actions for the value of other 15 The firm may gain increased local sales, however, from the resulting goodwill in the local community, an effect that shows up directly in profits. 16 Even here, the forecast is less different from the forecasts from the standard model than may at first appear. If human capital is equivalent to bonds in its risk characteristics, then increasing the fraction of total wealth that represents human capital crowds out bond holdings one for one until the entire financial portfolio is invested in equity. Only at that point does a further increase in the fraction of total wealth coming from human capital lower equity holdings, and even then only if the individual cannot borrow.
firms, or for the utility of other individuals in the economy, would effectively be ignored. While other concerns of the owners of a closely held firm, e.g. the welfare of the community in which they live, could well enter into the firm's decisions, their heavy investment in the firm suggests that as a first approximation they simply maximize the equivalent of own share value.
A testable forecast of the above model is that publicly traded corporations should pursue different objectives than closely held firms, e.g. firm behavior should change when a firm goes public. Whether or not publicly traded corporations behave more efficiently than closely held firms depends on the degree to which their efficiency-reducing incentive to exploit their combined monopoly power is outweighed by their efficiency-increasing incentive to take account of other externalities.
B. Particular applications
Externalities across firms
One striking result from the above model is that firms should take full account of any externalities they provide to other firms. As an example, spillovers of information across start-up computer firms in Silicon Valley is widespread, generated in part by hiring each other's employees and learning from them about new technical developments. Yet firms could in principle write labor contracts that impose large penalties for revealing trade secrets to competitors. If these firms were jointly financed by the same group of venture capitalists, however, then the venture capitalists would support the free flow of information across firms.
Similarly, if firms are largely owned by domestic shareholders, as emphasized by French and Poterba (1991) then these shareholders would treat very differently spillovers to domestic vs. foreign firms. Firms may then be much more reluctant to employ advanced technologies abroad than at home, whenever there is a risk that neighboring firms can learn about the technology.
Closely held firms, in contrast, would have no reason to care about any spillovers to other firms. Labor contracts in closely held firms would then be expected to include tighter restrictions with regard to revealing trade secrets than contracts in publicly traded firms.
Monopoly power
If firms attempt to maximize joint profits, then they have an incentive to collude and charge the monopoly price. The fact that shareholders may also be consumers of the firms' output must also be taken into account, however. Shareholders qua consumers are hurt by any increase in the price of the firms' output, which reduces the price they want the firms to charge.
17 If shareholding is proportional to wealth, and demand for the firm's output is also proportional to wealth, then shareholders would agree that the firm should not exploit its market power. In general, however, consumption is not proportional to financial wealth -a moderate fraction of individuals have little or no financial wealth at all. The testable forecast is then that publicly traded firms would be much more likely to exercise market power when producing goods purchased by those who depend primarily on labor income than when producing goods purchased by the wealthy. In contrast, closely held firms would be expected simply to exploit their market power whenever it exists.
Debt finance
The above model does not allow for debt finance. The traditional approach to modeling debt vs. equity decisions 18 is to argue that increased use of debt lowers taxes, because interest payments but not dividends are deductible from corporate taxable income. However, increased use of debt also raises the probability of bankruptcy, which has real costs. These real costs arise in large part due to conflicts of interest between different classes of creditors, which can lead to drawn out legal proceedings and decisions benefiting some classes of creditors at the expense of others.
19 Conflicts of interest between different creditors can also create agency costs prior to bankruptcy.
20 The firm trades off these various costs of extra debt against any tax savings to determine the firm's debt-equity ratio.
If corporate debt were introduced into the above model, but the model were otherwise left unchanged, then this debt would be risky in equilibrium and so would be part of the market portfolio of risky securities. Individual i would therefore own the fraction α i of both the equity and the debt issued by each firm. As a result, each shareholder would want the firm to ignore any conflicts of interest between debt and equity. Without the agency costs and bankruptcy costs that arise from the conflict of interest between different classes of creditors, debt finance would be less costly at the margin and more debt would be used.
This story may well explain why debt-equity ratios are much higher in Japan than in the U.S. In Japan, both equity and debt are heavily owned by a few large banks. To the extent that the same banks own both securities, they should want the firm to maximize firm value rather than equity value.
21
In the U.S., in contrast, debt and equity holdings are highly segmented. For one, U.S. bank regulations heavily restrict bank holdings of equity. In addition, the advantageous personal tax treatment of capital gains on equity is worth more to those in high tax brackets, so that equity and bonds have separate tax clienteles.
22 Conflicts of interest between debt and equity should therefore be much more important in the U.S., with the resulting agency and bankruptcy costs. This is a potential explanation, therefore, for why less debt is used by U.S. firms.
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18 See, for example, Gordon and Malkiel(1981) .
19 See, for example, Bulow and Shoven(1978) and White(1989) .
20 Standard references are Jensen and Meckling(1976) and Myers(1977) .
21 Prowse (1999) develops this argument more formally. Bartholdy et al (1997) provides evidence, however, that debt-equity ratios are not so high in countries other than Japan with large bank holdings of equity. 22 Note, however, that in the U.S. corporate bonds are owned mainly by banks, insurance companies, and defined-benefit pension plans. Since the return on these bonds ultimately belongs to the shareholders in these institutions, and not depositors, policy holders, or pension recipients, equity holders do own considerable corporate bonds. 23 As noted below, however, shareholders may well receive benefits from the government expenditures fi-
Charitable donations
Corporations make substantial charitable donations. In principle, this might be consistent with maximizing profits. For example, customers may be willing to pay more to a firm that is known to support particular charities. In addition, workers may be willing to work for a lower wage if the firm is known to donate generously to charities.
The above model forecasts that corporations may be willing to donate at times even when it reduces firm profits, as long as shareholders receive enough in direct benefits from these donations.
24 Having the firm, rather than shareholders, donate money has two advantages. First, the marginal tax savings from corporate charitable donations are commonly higher than the marginal tax savings from personal donations, due to the double taxation of corporate income. More importantly, the firm can solve the free-rider problem among individual corporate shareholders by donating for all of them simultaneously.
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To consider both advantages, let the corporate statutory tax rate be τ , let the personal tax rate of shareholder i on corporate dividend/capital gains income be e i , and let the shareholder's marginal personal tax rate saved on charitable donations be t i . Then the after-tax cost to this shareholder of a dollar donation by the corporation is α i (1−τ )(1−e i ), whereas the cost of donating directly is (1−t i ). Since α i << 1, corporate donations should normally dominate.
A further empirical implications is that these donations should tend to go to activities that benefit a large fraction of the firm's shareholders. Foreign-owned subsidiaries should therefore be much less likely to donate to host-country charities than would local firms. To gain support of enough domestic shareholders, the donations of a widely held corporation would need to go to charities that provide benefits nationally rather than locally. For example, donations to finance national broadcasts of the opera clearly fit these characteristics. For closely held firms, firm donations solve the free-rider problem only among the few shareholders of the firm, so would be less likely to be observed.
Pollution abatement
In the model above, corporations would also engage in more effort to restrict emissions than would easily be explained if they simply maximize profits subject to existing regulatory constraints. In fact the Bush Administration has proposed relying on such voluntary pollution abatement by firms, rather than having the government intervene to reduce pollution levels.
The above model does forecast that firms will abate to the extent that their shareholders benefit personally from this abatement.
26 Localized pollution, affecting only a nanced through extra tax payments, and to that extent be less concerned to reduce corporate tax payments through use of debt finance. small fraction of shareholders, would be unlikely to concern the median shareholder. Yet pollution affecting a larger area could be of concern. Firms may then be oblivious to hazardous wastes, regulatory pressures aside, since these affect only a small geographic area. In contrast, firms may be more concerned with emissions creating acid rain affecting a large fraction of the population. However, carbon emissions affecting global warming would be unlikely to be of much concern to a firm, assuming its shareholders are residents primarily in just one country. Again, owners of closely held firms receive a tiny fraction of the overall benefits yet bear the full costs of any abatement, so closely held firms would be forecast to pollute much more than publicly traded firms.
Measurement of Effective Corporate Tax Rates
Following the same logic, shareholders receive at least some benefits from any extra tax payments made by the firm. As long as the dollar-equivalent value of a marginal increase in public expenditures is proportional to wealth, then the model in fact forecasts that firms should care about their pretax rather than their after-tax return! 27 For example, the dollarequivalent value attached to extra military expenditures may well be roughly proportional to individual wealth-holdings, so be fully taken into account by shareholders.
28
Even if expenditures seem largely directed at the poor, shareholders may still recognize benefits from corporate tax payments. For example, government transfers to the poor benefit altruistic richer shareholders, and so may benefit the median shareholder in publicly traded firms.
Opposition to Foreign Control of Domestic Production
According to past theoretical results, the optimal policy for a country that is small relative to the world capital market is to allow foreign investment to occur free of taxes or other restrictions.
29 While portfolio investments by foreigners rarely generate much discussion and face low domestic taxes under most tax treaties, foreign acquisition of control over domestic firms often generates intense political opposition. Why? Is this simply xenophobia?
The above discussion provides a natural explanation for this opposition to foreign control per se. Assume, to simplify the discussion, that individual investors buy shares only in corporations based in their own country, but that each corporation can invest anywhere in the world.
30 Given this assumption, the "nationality" of a firm is well defined.
27 While working for Bell Laboratories in the early 1980's, I did hear top executives at AT&T argue that they set their tax payments taking into account the preferences of the broad range of the firm's stockholders. Consistent with this, they explicitly claimed to base investment decisions on the pretax rate of return. 28 If individual utility functions take the form U = C γ G θ , then the dollar-equivalent value of marginal government expenditures equals θC/(γG). Since G is the same for all individuals, this marginal value is proportional to C, so proportional to wealth in the above model. 29 See, for example, Razin-Sadka(1989) or Gordon(1992) . If the country has market power, however, as discussed in Gordon-Varian(1989) , then some intervention would be warranted. Market power of firms would also introduce complications, as in Krugman(1979) . 30 Firms, but not individual shareholders, may invest abroad due, for example, to economies to scale in If all firms act simply to maximize their own share value, then domestic and foreign firms should behave identically, and the "nationality" of a firm should be irrelevant -governments would still have no reason to intervene.
31 However, the types of supplementary concerns of foreign vs. domestic shareholders described above will differ, leading firms in fact to pursue different policies. Many types of supplementary concerns could in principle be present. For one, domestic-owned firms should be responsive to domestic nationaldefense concerns, whereas foreign-owned firms would try to aid the security position of their home countries, each acting in the interests of their shareholders.
32 Domestic firms would be more likely to donate to charities in the home country, 33 and to spend resources to abate pollution emissions in the home country. Domestic-owned firms would also to an extent take the social benefits funded by corporate tax payments into account, 34 and be less inclined to take full advantage of any monopoly power when selling to domestic consumers.
To the extent that domestic firms take these supplementary concerns into account, then they will not be maximizing share values. Firms under foreign control should therefore have higher share values, suggesting that foreigners can profitably acquire control over domestic firms, everything else equal.
35 As a result, the domestic government may have an incentive to discourage foreign acquisitions to the extent that domestic voters benefit from the responsiveness of domestic-owned firms to their shareholders' supplementary concerns.
Competition for Control of Corporations
When shareholder preferences differ, the characteristics of the median shareholder are important. I have assumed that no one shareholder is large enough relative to the market to influence the characteristics of the median shareholder. However, a wealthy enough group of shareholders who care little about other implications of the firm's actions (e.g. for whom ∂W i /∂Z f ≈ 0) potentially does have an incentive to take over the firm, shift its behavior to that of share-value maximization, and thereby profit from the resulting capital gathering information about foreign investment opportunities and in dealing with international financial transactions.
gains.
36 Does the above model merely forecast that ownership of each firm will become concentrated, so as to insure that the firm maximizes its share value?
37
Takeovers by a group aiming to maximize share values may not be so easy or attractive. To begin with, the optimal allocation of risk-bearing argues for broad ownership, so that a takeover by any group increases the costs of risk-bearing. These increased costs would be more important the larger and riskier the firm being taken over. In addition, there are freerider problems in coordinating within the group, since any one member of the group may prefer to buy fewer shares in order to avoid being so underdiversified. It is not necessarily even the case that a firm's share value will be higher under concentrated ownership -if not, then incentives for a raid disappear. In particular, firms with well diversified owners may cooperate more than closely held firms, leading to higher monopoly profits and higher share prices, offsetting any tendency to lower profits through e.g. pollution abatement or charitable donations.
In any case, the financial returns from a takeover are inherently limited. In particular, current regulations in the U.S. prevent a group from anonymously acquiring more than five percent of a firm's shares. Given that the group must announce publicly its attempt to acquire more shares, then those contemplating selling shares will sell only at a price at least as high as the price they expect to prevail later. If their expectations are rational, then the group cannot profit on the shares they purchase publicly, confining their profits to the five percent of shares acquired anonymously.
Consider for example the response to an offer from a potential takeover bid by a group of investors who offer to buy half (plus one) of the shares at a price equal to the expected price once they gain control, buying shares only if at least this many are tendered, and choosing randomly which shares to buy if more are tendered. 38 In order for that group to acquire a majority of the shares, the median shareholder must be willing to tender, and would realize that her decision will be pivotal.
39 Recall that this shareholder could have chosen the values of K f and Z f that maximize share values, yet chose not to do so. This means that the median shareholder would not be willing to tender her shares at an offer price equal to the value per share when profits are maximized. The takeover would necessarily fail at this bid.
The group bidding for shares could offer a bit more than the value per share when profits are maximized, as long as the overpayment on these 45% of the shares does not more than offset the profits they would then earn on the 5% of shares they could purchase 36 A different group who does care strongly about the implications of the firm's choice of Z f could also attempt to take over the firm. However, as a result of their investing heavily in the firm's shares, they will end up weighting heavily what happens to share values when making decisions, and so should end up behaving approximately like share-value maximizers. Note also that if a firm were taken over by another publicly owned corporation, the incentives faced by the firm would not change due to the takeover.
37 If so, the above story must still be taken into account when analyzing portfolio allocations, but not when analyzing firm behavior.
38 Given the increasing costs from further lack of diversification, I assume that the group wants to minimize the number of shares they purchase, while still gaining control.
39 Results would be the same if this individual perceives just some probability that her tendering will be pivotal, since she would be indifferent to tendering when it turns out she was not pivotal.
anonymously, less any additional costs from loss of diversification. Even so, the increased bid must be enough to more than overcome the net losses to the median shareholder from the implied changes in K f and Z f . A bid high enough to induce the median shareholder to tender her shares may or may not also be low enough to leave the bidding group with a net profit from the takeover. Some such takeovers may be possible, however. When they succeed, the bid price would need to be above the subsequent market-clearing price.
Perhaps leveraged buyouts can be understood in part as shifts to share-value-maximizing behavior. Certainly, managers are normally under much more pressure to maximize profits after a leveraged buyout. In fact, existing statistical work does indicate that profits tend to rise after a buyout, and that public shareholders are normally paid a sizable premium when firms go private.
40 These buyouts are not easy to explain using conventional models. For example, the shift in the manager's incentive package could equally well have been arranged earlier under public ownership. The hypothesis here is that it did not occur under public ownership because the public owners had more complicated objectives, and that the shift to private ownership enabled the managers to ignore these other objectives and focus on profit maximization.
Implications for Managerial Incentives
Ultimately, the behavior of the firm depends on the incentives faced by the manager. In the above discussion, managers were simply assumed to pursue the objectives desired by shareholders. But, as emphasized in the principal-agent literature, shareholders' ability to induce a manager to act in their interests is limited. Is it plausible that these limits result in managers acting, to first order, like value maximizers in spite of the more complicated objectives of shareholders? To what degree can we infer the underlying objectives of shareholders based on observed compensation schemes?
One major limitation that shareholders face when trying to induce a manager to act in their interests is that their information about the manager's specific actions and the implications of these actions is limited. Also, the information that is observable to shareholders may not be verifiable by third parties, making it difficult to base pay contracts on such information. One piece of information that is verifiable, at least for publicly traded corporations, is the firm's share value, making it easy to base a manager's compensation on this figure.
The theoretical derivation of the optimal compensation scheme for a firm's manager based only on share values, e.g. Holmstrom(1982) , finds that managers should be paid based on the performance of the firm's share value relative to that of shares in firms subject to the same outside shocks. Using the performance of other shares to control for the effects of outside shocks allows shareholders to measure better the effects of the manager's actions per se on the firm's share value. As a result, a manager's compensation should depend positively on her own firm's share value and negatively on the share values of firms subject to the same outside shocks.
This theoretical forecast is contradicted, however, by the empirical evidence on the actual compensation schemes of managers reported in Gibbons and Murphy(1989) . They regressed the compensation of 2214 executives in 1295 different corporations on the rate of return earned on their own firm's shares and on the rate of return earned on both the market portfolio and an industry portfolio. Not surprisingly, the return on the firm's own shares has a positive effect on the manager's compensation. The return on the market portfolio had a negative effect on the manager's compensation, with a coefficient roughly comparable in absolute value to that on the firm's rate of return, suggesting that compensation is based on the firm's performance relative to that of the market. However, the coefficient on the industry portfolio was close to zero, inconsistent with the Holmstrom results.
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In his theoretical derivation, Holmstrom assumes that a manager's actions affect the share value only of her own firm. However, gains in profits for one firm will often be at the expense of profits for other firms, especially those in the same industry. In this case, the best statistical measure of the economic implications of the manager's actions would assign an even more negative weight to the performance of competing firms in the same industry, deepening the puzzle.
Holmstrom's derivation also assumes, however, that a firm's shareholders care only about the value of that firm's shares. How do the results change if they also own shares in other firms? If the manager's options are one-dimensional, e.g. "effort," then the optimal compensation scheme still involves deriving the best statistical measure of the manager's "effort," and then paying her at the margin based on the economic gain to shareholders from a change in this "effort." The nature of the shareholder's objective affects only the latter figure. However, when the manager's options are multidimensional, then the nature of the compensation scheme affects the composition of the manager's actions. If these various actions are not directly observable, then the optimal compensation scheme would still be based on firm profits, but the specific formula would be a compromise among the optimal schemes for each dimension of the manager's options, taken separately. When a firm's shareholders also own shares in other firms, they would want to reward less those actions (e.g. advertising) that help one firm at the expense of others and want to reward more those actions (e.g. cost-reducing R&D) that benefit firms jointly. They can do this by basing the pay of the manager less negatively (more positively) on the share values of competing firms. Therefore, the observed compensation schemes reported in GibbonsMurphy(1989) may well be consistent with the theory once we take into account that shareholders have diversified portfolios.
If the pay of managers still depends negatively on the performance of competing firms, even if less so than would have occurred where shareholders did not have diversified portfolios, then managers would have at least some incentive to harm competitors. They certainly would not take full account of any benefits their actions provide to other firms, in spite of the underlying preferences of shareholders. Also, such compensation schemes would provide no incentives to managers to take into account any of the other types of supplementary concerns of shareholders discussed above.
In principle, shareholders can attempt to monitor the actions of the manager directly, through the Board of Directors, in order to induce the manager to take their supplementary 41 Gibbons and Murphy attempt to explain this anomaly by claiming that industry definitions are likely to be noisy, biasing the coefficient towards zero. However, they find similar results using much broader industry definitions. concerns into account. In practice, the influence of Boards of Directors seems limited, however. In any case, this just adds another layer to the principal-agent problem, since the shareholders then face the problem of designing the incentives facing the Board of Directors appropriately. In addition, if ownership of shares is widely dispersed, then shareholders have a free-rider problem: no shareholder individually would have the incentive to monitor the Board of Directors.
As a result of this free-rider problem, oversight of the firm should improve to the extent that financial intermediaries have a large enough stake in the firm to have influence, yet still represent diversified shareholders. In particular, financial intermediaries such as pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies control large blocks of shares, and have increasingly been using their influence to affect firm behavior. To what degree can the underlying claimants on these funds induce the managers of the funds to represent their interests? Because these funds hold diversified portfolios, they at least would want firms to take into account ways in which their actions affect the values of other firms. What about the other types of concerns of shareholders? When Directors of funds are elected, as in the case of TIAA-CREF, shareholders do have some mechanism through which to raise their supplementary concerns. Similarly, State-controlled pension plans face political pressure to represent the interests of residents in the State. These funds can use their voting power on proxy votes and their threat to adjust their portfolios to induce firms to take account of the many different concerns of their shareholders.
In summary, principal-agent problems make it difficult for shareholders to induce managers to take into account their supplementary concerns, while it is much easier to induce managers to care about the firm's own share value. The degree of difficulty, however, should depend on the nature of the supplementary concern, and on the types of financial institutions that exist. The evidence from Gibbons-Murphy(1989) , for example, suggests that the incentive schemes faced by managers may have been modified to reflect the diversified portfolio holdings of shareholders. Other concerns of shareholders may also end up affecting firm behavior. Firms, for example, do contribute to charities, and do spend real resources beyond what is required by regulations to abate their emissions. These supplementary concerns of shareholders therefore need to be kept in mind when trying to understand behavior of firms that seems inconsistent with value maximization.
Conclusions
By assuming that firms act to maximize their own share values, traditional models of corporate behavior implicitly assume that the only systematic way in which a firm's actions affect the welfare of its shareholders is through its own share values. However, a firm's shareholders may also be affected by the firm's decisions through their roles as shareholders in other firms, as lenders to the firm, as consumers of the firm's products, as people hurt by the pollution emitted, and even as citizens who benefit from the expenditures financed by the firm's taxes. If these effects are large enough, and if they affect a large enough share of the firm's shareholders, then the assumption that firms act in the interests of shareholders no longer implies share-value maximization. The implied changes in the forecasted behavior of the firm could easily challenge many standard conclusions. How important are these other ways in which shareholders are affected by a firm's actions?
What implications would these effects have for the forecasted behavior of the firm?
To begin with, standard models of portfolio choice forecast that equity holders invest proportionally in the shares of all publicly traded firms.
42 This implies that equity holders want each firm to take full account of all the ways in which its actions affect the value of other firms in the economy. Such externalities could arise from a spillover of information, e.g. from R&D, or from attempts to market new products. They could also arise from competitive actions that lower industry profits, such as charging a price below the monopoly price or advertising in a way that raises own profits at the expense of industry profits. If firms do take these spillovers into account, then collusion among existing firms would become much easier since firms would not focus on how market shares are divided among the firms in the industry.
43 Even breaking up firms through antitrust policy would prove to be ineffective.
Shareholders are also customers of the firm. Ignoring this fact, the publicly traded firms within each industry, acting in the interests of their shareholders, should take full advantage of their collective market power. The larger the fraction of their output that is purchased by their own shareholders, however, the less willing they should be to exploit this monopoly power. If shareholders are primarily domestic citizens, for example, then export-oriented firms should be more willing to exploit market power than firms selling domestically.
Ignoring tax and regulatory distortions to portfolio composition, 44 standard models also forecast that investors will invest proportionately in all risky securities, implying that they would buy in equal proportion all the securities issued by any given firm. As a result, investors would care only about total firm value, and not just about the value of equity. This suggests that the seeming importance of the conflict of interest between different classes of creditors in the U.S. arises from government policies that distort portfolio choice rather than from any more fundamental aspect of the operation of publicly traded corporations. In countries like Japan in which both corporate equity and corporate bonds are heavily owned by a few large banks, conflicts of interest between different classes of creditors seem much less important. Therefore, changes in these tax and regulatory distortions to portfolio composition may have more far reaching effects than is normally thought.
All of these arguments apply only to publicly traded corporations. Since ownership of other firms is typically concentrated among very few individuals, these other firms are still likely to maximize share values. The model therefore predicts that publicly traded firms pursue different objectives than closely held firms. When firms change status, e.g. when they go public or undergo a leveraged buyout, their behavior would therefore be forecasted to change. As a result, this theory may explain why profits of firms that are bought out tend to rise and why profits of firms that go public tend to stagnate.
If publicly owned firms pursue different objectives than do privately owned firms, what 42 Tax distortions, however, may lead high-tax-rate individuals to favor shares in firms with a low dividend payout rate, though these effects do not seem large.
43 International competition would remain unaffected, however, if firms based in different countries are owned by different sets of shareholders.
44 Bank regulations, for example, allow banks to invest much more easily in debt than in equity.
implications does this have for public policy? The model in section 1 does not necessarily imply that publicly owned firms behave more efficiently. They may, for example, cooperate with other firms in the industry to charge a price above marginal cost. In theory, taxes or regulations could be used to encourage whatever ownership structure leads to the greatest public benefits. If these effects are important, then any analysis of policies such as the corporate income tax that may affect a firm's choice of organizational form would need to assess whether or not publicly traded corporations behave more efficiently than other firms.
